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Abstract
In the United States, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is
seeking to encourage researchers to move away from diagnostic tools like
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the DSM). A key
mechanism for this is the “Research Domain Criteria” (RDoC) initiative,
closely associated with former NIMH Director Thomas Insel. This article
examines how key figures in US (and UK) psychiatry construct the pur-
pose, nature, and implications of the ambiguous RDoC project; that is,
1Centre for Biomedicine, Self and Society, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Martyn Pickersgill, Centre for Biomedicine, Self and Society, University of Edinburgh, Teviot
Place, Edinburgh EH8 9AG, United Kingdom.
Email: martyn.pickersgill@ed.ac.uk
Science, Technology, & Human Values
2019, Vol. 44(4) 612-633
ª The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0162243919841693
journals.sagepub.com/home/sth
how its novelty is constituted through discourse. In this paper, I explore
and analyze these actors’ accounts of what is new, important, or
(un)desirable about RDoC, demonstrating how they are constituted
through institutional context and personal affects. In my interviews with
mental health opinion leaders, RDoC is presented as overly reliant on
neurobiological epistemologies, distant from clinical imaginaries and
imperatives, and introduced in a top-down manner inconsistent with the
professional norms of scientific research. Ultimately, the article aims to
add empirical depth to current understandings about the epistemological
and ontological politics of contemporary (US) psychiatry and to contrib-
ute to science and technology studies (STS) debates about “the new” in
technoscience. Accordingly, I use discussions about RDoC as a case study
in the sociology of novelty.
Keywords
psychiatry, neuroscience, mental health, novelty
As Keating and Cambrosio (2004, 357) have reflected, the “idea of
reducing pathology to biology has an extensive history.” In psychiatry,
many have supported the application of biological approaches to com-
prehending and treating mental ill-health. In the United States, for
instance, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has—along-
side its attention to the social and psychological dimensions of pur-
ported psychopathology (Pickersgill 2010)—long presented biological
approaches to psychiatry as epistemologically “revelatory” (Casey
2017, 239). An emphasis on biology in psychiatry is often linked to
the American Psychiatric Association (APA)’s Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Detailing all the conditions the
APA recognizes as legitimate, the influential 1980 third edition (DSM-
III) helped to shift attention toward the biological aspects of mental ill-
health (Mayes and Horwitz 2005). Subsequently, the DSM has become
one of the key means through which psychopathology is defined,
framed, and acted upon. In the United States and several other nations,
it acts as a vital “connective tissue” (Lakoff 2005, 13), materializing
and facilitating associations between diverse institutions and actors with
a stake in mental ill-health. This includes the APA and the NIMH; for
example, the latter funded much of the work underpinning DSM-III
(Decker 2013) and sponsored planning meetings for more recent DSM
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revisions (Pickersgill 2014). However, the agency has become more
hesitant in endorsing the DSM.
This hesitancy has been instantiated through an NIMH program advo-
cated by former Director Thomas Insel: the Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC) initiative. Launched in 2010, RDoC is intended to be a framework
for thinking about how specific characteristics of what are deemed psy-
chopathologies can be more precisely investigated in order to produce
enhanced understanding and potentially therapeutics (Insel et al. 2010).
Insel described RDoC as a project “incorporating genetics, imaging, cog-
nitive science, and other levels of information to lay the foundation for a
new classification system” (Insel 2013). It is perhaps more commonly
regarded as a neurobiological initiative aiming “to transform psychiatry
into an integrative science of psychopathology in which mental illnesses
will be defined as involving putative dysfunctions in neural nodes and
networks” (Akram and Giordano 2017, 592). In advancing RDoC, the
NIMH has downplayed the DSM. As one (in)famous blog post from Insel
(2013) described, “Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lym-
phoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about
clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure.”
Consequently, the NIMH would, apparently, “be re-orientating its
research away from DSM categories” (Insel 2013).
This article is concerned with how key figures in US (and UK) psychia-
try construct the purpose, nature, and implications of the ambiguous RDoC
project. Many have offered appraisals of the initiative, including social
scientists (e.g., Whooley 2014), in contributions that are variously celebra-
tory and castigating. In particular, RDoC has been called out for its biolo-
gical emphasis; hence, I want to underscore that my intent here is not to
contribute yet another reproving commentary. As indicated, psychiatrists
are perfectly able to criticize RDoC themselves and often do so through an
idiom similar to that employed by sociologists and others concerned about,
for instance, biological reductionism in mental health praxis. Instead of
straightforward criticism, I explore and analyze how major institutional
actors’ accounts of what is new, important, or (un)desirable about RDoC
are constituted through institutional context and personal affects. In so
doing, I aim to add empirical depth to current understandings about the
epistemological and ontological politics of contemporary (US) psychiatry
and to contribute to debates about “the new” in technoscience. Accordingly,
I use discussions about RDoC as a case study in what we might term the
sociology of novelty.
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Contextualizing RDoC
What is RDoC? Ultimately, it is a kind of epistemic infrastructure providing
a framework for (new kinds of) research. RDoC is visualized on the NIMH
website as a series of biopsychosocial “domains” (such as “negative valence
systems”) that are subdivided into different (generally psychological)
“constructs” (https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/constru
cts/rdoc-matrix.shtml). One example is “frustrative nonreward,” defined
as “Reactions elicited in response to withdrawal/prevention of reward,
i.e., by the inability to obtain positive rewards following repeated or sus-
tained efforts” (https://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/rdoc/constru
cts/frustrative-nonreward.shtml). “Units of analysis” are detailed for each
construct and indicate biological, psychological, and experimental foci for
research effects; these disaggregate as genes, molecules, cells, circuits,
physiology, behaviors, self-reports, and paradigms. In the case of frustrative
nonreward, one paradigm listed is “the Laboratory Temperament Assess-
ment Battery (Lab-TAB),” which is a psychological inventory for assessing
“early temperament” in laboratory settings.
The presentation of RDoC on the NIMH website does not lend itself to
a straightforward interpretation nor does its description in many publica-
tions about the initiative. Rather, elucidating its meaning requires work
(and not, as we will later see, only for individuals outside of psychiatry
and psychology). Consequently, these meanings multiply as RDoC is
discussed in coffee rooms, conferences, blog posts, and journal pages.
Nevertheless, RDoC represents a scheme for intervening in the epistemol-
ogy of psychiatry—and, consequently, understandings of the ontology of
psychopathology.
One possible motivation for RDoC is a much-discussed shift away from
drug discovery for mental ill-health by the pharmaceutical industry (see
Miller 2010). Cuthbert and Insel (2013; who is a key NIMH architect of
RDoC) have asserted that psychiatry “has essentially excluded biological
findings that do not map on to the current heterogeneous categories of
symptom clusters” (p. 3). Accordingly, “issues with the current nosology
markedly affect the treatment development arena” (p. 3). Insel (2013)
described in his aforementioned blog post that the NIMH was “committed
to new and better treatments, but we feel this will only happen by devel-
oping a more precise diagnostic system.” Through such public-facing state-
ments, Insel has contributed to structuring the NIMH as a promissory
organization (Pollock and Williams 2010) that defines epistemic require-
ments and generates expectations that these will be provided for (cf. Mittra
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2016, 67). In this way, he and other senior NIMH figures consolidate their
own authority and that of their organization. This can be read as part of a
broader strategy for limiting symbolic and material divestment in (biologi-
cal) psychiatry and (re)invigorating support for mental health research and
development.
RDoC was introduced at a time when the so-called team science was
becoming more widely emphasized in mental health research. As in bio-
medicine more broadly (Mittra 2016), psychiatry is increasingly constituted
through large-scale, multi-intuition collaborative projects that entail diverse
expertise (Arribas-Ayllon and Bartlett 2014). The Brain Research through
Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies (BRAIN) Initiative is an exem-
plar. Announced by US President Barack Obama in 2013 as a multidisci-
plinary, interagency, and private–public partnership, the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) (2017) invested US$260 million in the program in 2017
alone through ten of its institutes (including NIMH). As with other neuro-
biologically focused endeavors, it is imbued with considerable therapeutic
promise (Rubin 2008): Insel’s NIMH successor, Joshua Gordon, recently
asserted, for example, that “Truly transformative treatments will only come
if we invest heavily in basic neuroscience efforts, including but not limited
to the BRAIN Initiative” (Society for Neuroscience 2017).
The NIMH has also emphasized the need for, and invested heavily in,
whole genomic sequencing (Sanders et al. 2017). It is, for instance, a partner
in the Whole Genome Sequencing for Psychiatric Disorders Consortium,
which—in the spirit of RDoC—aims to develop a data repository to
“facilitate large-scale analyses within and across four psychiatric disorders”
(Sanders et al. 2017, 1666, emphasis added). Molecular approaches are also
supported through core NIMH research platforms, with its Repository and
Genomics Resource (NRGR; established in a previous guise in 1998) cur-
ating and distributing biomaterials for psychiatric genetic research. As
members of the NIMH Office of Genomics Research Coordination have
argued, an “explicit goal” of the NRGR “is the mapping of data from
traditional DSM-based clinical phenotypic assessments onto RDoC-like
domains” (Senthil et al. 2017, 1660). NIMH endeavors like the NRGR
reinscribe molecular ways of thinking within psychiatry (Rose 2001). Rhet-
orically and practically, they also gradually dilute the singular salience of
the DSM to psychiatric knowledge production.
Despite such initiatives, it is worth highlighting that the DSM continues
to stand in for many as the final arbiter between normality and pathology.
This was strikingly visible over 2017, within extensive professional and
public debates around whether US President Donald Trump has
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“narcissistic personality disorder.” Through anchoring discussions in the
idiom and categorizations of the DSM, commentators perform and under-
score its centrality, authority, and veracity. Still, these descriptors of the
APA text are increasingly rendered problematic: it is not uncommon to see
articles in prestigious psychiatry and neurobiology journals describing the
DSM criteria as, for example, “somewhat ‘fuzzy’ and imprecise” (Braff
2017, 1657). Although the extent to which the DSM adequately captures
reality has long been debated (Pickersgill 2014), it is noteworthy that reject-
ing its facticity and utility is increasingly legitimate within biomedicine.
Analyzing RDoC
This article analyzes how key mental health researchers and practitioners
negotiate the meaning and standing of RDoC as a novel object. Webster
(drawing on Barry 2001) has argued that it can be “difficult to identify
novelty in-itself, since there is much evidence that shows how the same
technoscience can be positioned and repositioned as old and new, depend-
ing on the networks and audiences it seeks to embrace or mobilise” (Web-
ster 2005, 236, emphasis in original; see also Webster 2002). I take
seriously and extend this insight (Pickersgill 2013), regarding novelty not
as quintessence but rather as negotiated and attributed through often geo-
graphically or institutionally specific forms of sociotechnical praxis.
Accordingly, my perspective has some theoretical resonance with other
work that has considered adjectival concepts such as analyses of complexity
(e.g., Arribas-Ayllon, Bartlett, and Feathersone 2010; Broer, Bal, and Pick-
ersgill 2017; Dan-Cohen 2016).
More generally, I take cues from the methodological relativism orienting
early studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK; Bloor [1976]
1991) and related endeavors. In this respect, I am less interested in whether
RDoC is “really” novel or not, than in the question of whether and how it is
described as such, and with what ramifications. Nevertheless, while I owe
intellectual debts to writers like Bloor (as well as, of course, to other
foundational and contemporary work in science and technology studies),
this paper is not an attempt to develop an explicitly or narrowly SSK
analytics of novelty. This not least given the “blind spots” (Delamont
1987) that can result from close adherence to an SSK approach.
This article uses data from, primarily, sixteen semistructured interviews
with very influential scientists and clinicians with the professional capital
and institutional capacity to contribute in key ways to shaping the contexts
of US (and UK) psychiatry. Of these, eleven were themselves certified
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psychiatrists. The data were collected as part of a wider study exploring
changing understandings of diagnostic categories in research and clinical
practice within the United States and United Kingdom. The respondents
discussed here were selected on the basis of their capacity to influence
change in psychiatric praxis more broadly, that is, on account of their
institutional position or due to being widely and internationally recognized
research leaders.1 The sample included current and former senior officials
of the APA and NIMH (and other funding organizations), editors of high-
impact psychiatric journals, and leaders of major US psychiatry depart-
ments (referred to below as R1, R2, . . . , R16).
In the interviews, I queried participants about their wider clinical and
research foci, the place and role of diagnosis in psychiatry, and their experi-
ences and perspectives regarded RDoC. My respondents spoke with various
degrees of frankness; one asked midway through the interview for the voice
recorder to be paused, while others communicated through tone and facial
expression that which they were cautious about stating on tape. Following
transcription, the data were thematically analyzed, with interviews coded
according to the initial concerns of the research and issues that became
apparent as the study progressed.
In what follows, I present and discuss these data, describing different
ways through which the novelty of RDoC was constructed and negotiated. I
highlight, in particular, reflections on the kinds of research RDoC might
propel, concerns about the distance between the laboratory and the clinic
the initiative could expand, and antipathy expressed toward it, to the NIMH,
and to Thomas Insel himself.
Epistemic Catalysis
Commenting on the introduction of RDoC, R4—a senior member of the
NIMH—reflected, “at first it was very novel to people, very different from
how most people had thought about these disorders.” Initially, R4 felt that
many “traditional psychiatrists had a hard time thinking about the disorders
in any but the DSM categories.” As he puts it: “It’s like ‘what do you mean
there’s no depression and no schizophrenia and I have to think about these
other things?!’ and that was a hard shift.” Nevertheless, “many psychiatrists,
and psychologists, who do neuro-imaging and those types of areas naturally
felt like ‘good, this is the opportunity to really integrate these things.’” R4
described how RDoC was “welcomed”: those “who had been saying, ‘you
guys need to do something different about diagnosis,’ they said ‘good, this
might not be the way we thought about it but we’ll move that way.’” Today,
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R4 felt, “people have caught on to the idea” of RDoC; there is a “quite
healthy groundswell or even accelerating, you know, tide of people saying
that this is really how we need to go.”
Certainly, several of my respondents indicated degrees of approval of
RDoC as a stimulus for new work in, primarily, biological psychiatry. In
this respect, RDoC was presented as a “very interesting” way of “addressing
research problems” (R1), a worthwhile “experiment” (R13), and an
“exciting” (R14) and “very courageous” initiative that could offer “a huge
cultural change” (R3). Some respondents discussed how this work would
enhance “treatment development” (R12), which R3—editor of a major
psychiatric journal—claimed was “part of the reason people got interested
in moving toward RDoC.” For him, “as we, get closer and closer to the
cellular pathology of the disorders we are going to discover, I would predict,
that our treatments are more and more specific.” Part of the novelty of
RDoC, then, was its purported capacity to propel biomedical innovation.
In one of the longer interviews, the enthusiastic R3 told me over lunch
that various different aetiologies for the category of depression exist. These,
he asserted, were treated as if they “are all the same”—but “they’re not all
the same.”2 This kind of position about the ontology of pathology is increas-
ingly evident within the psychiatric literature and has been apparent in
many of my ongoing conversations with scientists and clinicians. R6
described how RDoC spoke to the kinds of complex ontological imaginaries
that are now finding increased traction:
Psychiatric research, because of the DSM, and other diagnostic systems, has
been focused on disease entities, these so-called polythetic constructs. Where
a, a erm multiple permutations of signs and symptoms can give rise to one
particular diagnosis, depression being a good example. And the idea was that,
it doesn’t really matter how we come up with these different clusters, as long
as they are being reliably diagnosed, they will lead to some common pathway,
to some common pathology. And RDoC simply states that that’s unlikely
going to be true, because we haven’t found very much with that strategy for
the last decades. And to really, that’s really the issue, to benefit from the
power of neuroscience and genetics research, to really maximize the potential
impact of basic science research, we need to now reframe the research in
psychiatry. We need to refocus it away from the psychiatric diagnosis.
In the extract above, we can see how R6’s account of the conceptual
underpinnings of RDoC explicitly contrasts these with those of the DSM.
This kind of comparative account as a means of signaling the import and
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novelty of RDoC is currently common in clinical psychiatric and neuroge-
netic discourse. For instance, R8—a key member of a UK funding agency—
stated that one advantage of RDoC was that “it tried to move away from
DSM-defined diagnoses into breaking it down into more mechanistic
phenotypes.” A former leader within the NIMH, R12, also cast his discus-
sion of RDoC in relation to the DSM (and in the strongest terms of all the
respondents). For him, “the main advance” of RDoC was “liberating inves-
tigators from the cognitive tyranny of the DSM categories.” Even R1, a
senior member of the APA critical of the dimensionality of RDoC and a
defender of the categorical approach of DSM, noted the challenges of
researching DSM disorders rather than specific components of those
constructs:
one thing that I think anybody who knows something about this will agree, is
that the categories that we use in psychiatry are not monolithic, they probably
are, you know, amalgams of several sub-categories. And to the extent that
that’s true, that makes it a lot more difficult to identify the biological
underpinnings.
Appraisals of RDoC were thus commonly grounded in characterizations of
what the participants felt psychiatric pathologies really were and the degree
to which research that employed the DSM system could accommodate such
ontologies. Accordingly, for US-based interviewees (who generally had
much to say about RDoC, both good and bad), the novelty and significance
attributed to RDoC related to its perceived conceptual distance from the
DSM. This underscored the extent to which the DSM acts, still, as a con-
ceptual “anchor” (cf. van der Sluijs et al. 1998) within US psychiatry.
In the United Kingdom, however, the DSM is less central to mental
health praxis. Although influential, the World Health Organization’s Inter-
national Classification of Diseases is more significant within clinical infra-
structures (e.g., through the National Health Service information
technology systems). Further, few scientists would see the NIMH as a
go-to funder; rather, the Wellcome Trust, the Medical Research Council,
and the UK Department of Health and Social Care’s National Institute for
Health Research are the key mental health research sponsors. This context
shaped the accounts of my UK interviewees. Generally, RDoC was pre-
sented as having salience for US researchers applying to the NIMH and
interested in DSM diagnostic entities but as less (or ir)relevant to UK
scientists seeking domestic sponsorship.3 For instance, R16, an eminent
UK psychiatrist, noted that since he was not in receipt of NIH funds, RDoC
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was “not worth bothering about” (although he had some strong views about
its relationship to [US] clinical psychiatry, as we will later see). While
RDoC emerged as part of the NIMH landscape in 2010 (Insel et al.
2010), when I asked one journal editor, R7, how aware UK psychiatrists
were of RDoC prior to Insel’s infamous 2013 blog post, he replied: “Oh I
don’t think they were very aware of it at all.” In response to a query about
his position on RDoC, R17, a senior member of the Royal College of
Psychiatrists, told me:
I mean I have the same view as anyone, I’m sure one day it’ll work, but it’s, it
was a bit premature. And I mean, we’ve had those promises before, so far they
haven’t, I mean, it’s a bit like the whole DSM-5 rhetoric itself, it was ahead of
itself. There’s nothing wrong with those ideas, it’s just they’re not there yet,
so unfortunately the whole thing turned out to be a bit of a damp squib, didn’t
it? And er so, yeah. I mean I know Tom Insel, and he’s a very bright guy, but I
mean I think he’s struggling the same way everyone else is. One day there’ll
be these changes, but they haven’t yet really happened, and we just continue
to work away as we do.
R17’s talk minimized the import of RDoC, presenting it as a worthy enough
initiative that was nevertheless less impressive than intended (i.e., “a damp
squib”4). An absence of import was not necessarily problematic, however:
researchers and clinicians would “just continue to work away” as they have
always done. In many of the comments from US-based professionals, the
counterposing of RDoC and the DSM as different approaches to under-
standing mental ill-health presented RDoC as self-evidently novel; yet, the
comments of R7—made in an institutional context where neither the NIMH
nor the APA hold any kind of formal influence—unsettle framings of inno-
vativeness as such.
Clinical Distance
While some participants enthusiastically discussed the epistemic catalysis
RDoC might enjoin, others—and occasionally the same interviewees—
expressed disquiet about its conceptual underpinnings and implications.
When I ventured in an interview with R2, a prominent US scientist, that I
personally found the RDoCmatrix a little confusing, they replied: “I think it’s
really confusing, particularly to clinicians.” R2 reflected that “unfortunately
what has happened is we have gone from diagnosis to a new boxology”—the
“simplicity” of which has “hindered our science.” Ultimately, the RDoC
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matrix was “just kind of a ridiculous thing.” This ridiculousness was partly
related to the institutional cartography R2 felt was implied by RDoC, wherein
clinical and basic research were positioned as far apart:
every single RDoC RFA [Request for Applications], that has come out of the
United States has basically said, animal—if you’re combining animal studies
with this, need not apply to this mechanism. Which, to me [ . . . ] is shit,
because the only way that we can really understand mechanisms is if, if we
can really work with the animal scientist. And just when I felt like clinicians
and basic scientists, both human and animal, were coming together, this
pushed us into a silo again.
The imaginaries of clinicians that contoured R2’s reflections manifested in
many of my discussions with mental health scientists (some of whom drew
on their own clinical experience and expertise to adjudicate RDoC). In a
minority of interviews, characterizations of clinicians that emphasized their
epistemic limitations were leveraged as a mechanism to explain a lack of
practical salience for RDoC. R3, for example, was personally positive about
RDoC, but noted challenges for other psychiatrists who had “I would say an
amateur’s understanding of the brain.” Consequently, it was “hard to ima-
gine” how psychiatry might move toward a conception of pathology that
was “more nuanced and realistic and brain based.” In R6’s words, most US
psychiatrists “feel they can be a good enough” without “really knowing
anything about the brain”; hence, nothing enjoined them to engage with
RDoC or the work it sought to propel.
Far more common than castigations of clinicians, though, were direct
criticisms of the design of RDoC and of NIMH funding emphases. It was
these that the majority of my interlocutors constructed as generative of the
purported distance of RDoC from the clinic, rather than a failure of imagi-
nation or training on the part of psychiatrists. For instance, despite describing
RDoC as “interesting” for research purposes, R1 stated that “as someone who
knows quite a bit about the RDoC project, I can tell you that it’s so not ready
for prime-time it’s not funny.” In particular, it did not “comport well with
how doctors in general are trained or think about things.” R10, a senior
psychiatrist, similarly noted that RDoC “doesn’t start out with patients as
ordinary doctors would identify them, and that’s a real problem.” One journal
editor, R7, also described how RDoC—despite being “interesting”—“suffers
I think from not really having much to do with the clinic right now.” R9—a
very influential US-based researcher—explained this disconnect between the
epistemic ambitions of the RDoC initiative and its clinical ramifications
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through the origins of the RDoC initiative: “RDoCwas designed kind of in an
ivory tower to try to improve conceptualization of research. And it wasn’t at
all designed thinking of the day-to-day activities of [psychiatrists].” Its lim-
itations were unpacked as follows:
RDoC certainly has some virtues. But it doesn’t translate at all well to what
the average psychiatrist does when he or she sees a patient. I mean, they’re
not going to say “does this patient have a problem with positive valence
systems?” They’re just not. Or negative valence systems or, you know, what-
ever one you want to pick. They’re going to see people coming in. They’re
used to asking about, you know, how was their mood and how was their sleep
and how was, you know, all the various things that go into evaluating a patient
and making a diagnosis. And, it’s going to be a long way from RDoC to daily
clinical practice.
In the UK, R16 noted that “it’s quite good that we have alternatives” to the
DSM, but he did not particularly “like the RDoC” since it “didn’t seem to
make much clinical sense to me.” Like R9 above, he drew attention to the
lack of clinical expertise enrolled in the development of RDoC: “there were
no practicing clinicians on the committee that drew it up. So it’s I think in
my view over, over influenced by mouse models and so on.” Although
R16’s own research was quite biologically oriented, he was also critical
of the apparent somatic emphasis of RDoC: “I think it’s been too, it’s been a
hundred per cent biological, and it operates on the basis that psychiatric
disorders are a manifestation of brain pathology or brain deviance. So, I’ve
been a bit hostile er to that.”
Resonant with such perspectives, R6 asserted that the RDoC initiative
was “basically a revolution of cognitive neuroscientists who have now seen
the opportunity to shape some of the psychiatry research according to their
view of the world. And that will go on for a little while, until people realize
it will not lead to anything in psychiatry.” Ultimately:
I will go so far to say that when everything is said and done, RDoC will be a
great boost for new knowledge in neuroscience, with little impact on psy-
chiatry. It will lead to a significant advance in our understanding of human
behavior, and the neural basis of human behaviors. [ . . . ] But it will have little
impact on the true task of psychiatry.
The “true task” of psychiatry would only be ensured if the introduction of
RDoC had tangible consequences: particularly, though not exclusively, the
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development of new therapies. Yet, most interviewees seemed to regard this
as a very distant prospect. R11, for instance, claimed that RDoC “is prob-
ably not going to yield anything for a long long time, in terms of new
treatments.” R9 likewise asserted that they had “thought quite a bit about
RDoC” and could not “see it translating to treatment.” When I asked R1
whether treatment development might link with RDoC in some way, their
response underscored widely perceived institutional and conceptual
complications:
It’s a very good question, certainly for pharma, the determining factor usually
is the FDA, in terms of how they design their trials, and it would be difficult to
imagine the FDA would move away from the current model that it has, where
medicines are for indications, erm diagnostic indications generally speaking.
So erm it’s hard to imagine that they would move away from that. In partic-
ular, since we don’t even have a sense of, like as an example, erm if you’re
looking at constructs that I have a very hard time with is, frustrative nonre-
ward. Don’t ask me what it means, I’ve read it many times, I don’t understand
it. But we don’t have a threshold beyond which we, we think its pathological
to have that, so then how would you determine when you institute a treat-
ment? You know? There’s just not enough information.
In the comments above, R1 moves almost seamlessly from a relatively dis-
passionate assessment of RDoC and innovation in terms of the path-
dependencies associated with the Food and Drug Administration to a more
affective critique of RDoC constructs. Movement across critical registers was
not uncommon within the interviews; in particular, participants skipped
between complaints about RDoC, negative assessments of the NIMH, and
judgments about Thomas Insel himself. With regard to the latter, criticism
was sometimes muted or mild. For instance, R5 (a senior researcher) noted
that RDoC was oriented toward “the research community” not “at
practitioners”; by remarking that “I think Insel would admit that,” R5 implied
this was a weakness. However, as we will now see, far more explicit (and
imbricated) criticisms of Insel, RDoC, and the NIMH were also evident.
Against Unilateralism
The extent to which RDoC had ruffled the feathers of many in US psychia-
try was highlighted in my interviews with UK psychiatrists and funders. As
R16, an influential UK psychiatrist, described:
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I was quite happy to see Tom Insel arguing with the DSM-5 people but I . . . I
think, RDoC got a lot more attention because Tom Insel controlled the fund-
ing. And I, a lot of American researchers were privately very hostile to it but
they knew that you couldn’t get funded unless you went-went along with it.
I likewise encountered hostility in my encounters with US clinicians and
researchers. Notwithstanding the various critical commentaries that had
been produced about RDoC, I was still a little surprised at the extent of
this. Some reactions were couched in terms of pragmatic self-interest, with
interviewees sharing their own and others’ concerns that RDoC had nega-
tive funding implications based on how they had studied psychiatric dis-
orders to-date. Others, as we will see, related more to the particular set of
relationships of authority that enabled, and were consolidated through, the
ways in which RDoC was presented to the (US) research community.
Early in my research, I spoke with R4, a senior member of the NIMH.
As detailed above, he described what he saw as a growing interest in
RDoC from scientists especially. When I asked about the wider reception
to RDoC, he noted a series of “misperceptions.” Conjuring a kind of
deficit model of psychiatric understanding of the initiative, the NIMH,
and Insel, R4 ultimately seemed to feel that fuller comprehension of
RDoC would lead to more widespread acceptance of it. In fact, some
psychiatrists appear to have responded more, not less, negatively to RDoC
as the initiative has unfolded. R9 puts it this way: “I guess when RDoC
first appeared I felt better about it than I do now.” The initiative was
deemed to have “become a primary goal of NIMH to the exclusion of
other ways of thinking,” and “even though it looks complicated, it’s over-
simplified things.”
For R4, one misunderstanding about RDoC was that it “seems very
prescriptive to people.” However, he felt its true purpose was “just the
opposite”: “it’s to help us free up people.” Still, R4’s view that RDoC
appeared “prescriptive” was certainly corroborated by my interviews.
R10, for instance, told me that “There’s been a lot of concern, particularly
in the clinical research community, about the Director of the NIMH” and
noted that RDoC had been “divisive.” When I asked what that meant, he
replied: “in the sense that there were a lot of people in the clinical research
community who felt that this was something that was being imposed on,
rather than deriving from the material. You know, the scientific material.
That there was a kind of artificial imposition.” R6, editor of a prestigious
psychiatry journal, similarly reflected:
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the fundamental flaw of RDoC is that it was made as an executive decision. It
was made from a group of people that were able to control the allocation of
resources. And researchers typically do not er look fondly on such a[n]
executive decision to shape how they should think, you know how they should
do their work.
One high-profile psychiatrist, R5, described how Insel “has been far more
proactive in shaping research agendas than previous directors, thinking that
he knows the right way for psychiatric research.” To this end:
What Insel has done is basically taken, if we do a run from very basic
molecular cellular erm small circuit kind of large network imaging neurop-
sychology, what he’s basically said is that patch is where we’re going to get
all the action. So it’s really the sort of marriage of function—of systems of
neuroscience and neuropsychology. And that’s where we’re going to really
find answers. Wow! That’s a fair touch of hubris.
Through RDoC, R5 felt the NIMH were “asking interesting questions, so if
this were a recommendation that people might use, I wouldn’t have any
problem with that. It’s really the enforcement part that I take umbrage at.”
In contrast to Insel’s style of leadership, he argued that it was not “the goal
of funders at the level of directors to be highly proscriptive.” This, he felt,
was “not their job.” Insel, though, had “reached down and shifted resources
in a more forthright way than I actually think is optimally healthy. It’s
actually a little scary.”
Two representatives of UK funding agencies I spoke with shared the
view that Insel had acted somewhat unilaterally over the release of RDoC.
While one (R8) noted that he had been “very smart” and had “pushed
people” to shift their research emphases, another (R15) said:
I don’t think, I don’t see any move, at least at the moment, for us to go as far
as NIMH who have sort of mandated that the research has to go you know
under the research domain criteria rather than diagnosis-based. We’ve kind
of got flexibility there. I don’t think we would probably force people to go
down that route.
Much of the critique emerged in the interviews after I asked about wider
reactions to the director’s blog post quoted in the introduction to this article.
Part of the furor about this related to its release just a few weeks before
publication of the much-anticipated DSM-5. My respondent at the NIMH
(R4) noted that this time line “looked like [Insel] had deliberately timed it,”
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though claimed this “wasn’t so.” R1 laughingly recalled the piece as
“uncharacteristically intemperate!” R2 felt that “it kind of said that we don’t
know anything about mental illness and didn’t have a biological base. I
mean, it can be misinterpreted that way.” This “upset” a “lot of people.”
R11 told me the following story when I asked about whether there had been
much discussion about the blog post:
[W]e have a weekly lunch meeting. That was really the hot topic. Er, erm, I
think there was, er [sigh]. At the time, I think there was a lot of criticism of
Tom because he failed to recognize [ . . . ] that there are a lot of therapeutic
approaches that exist that really help people. And none of them er were
discovered by any kind of scientific process. Erm, that if we gave up on trial
and error and serendipity, we’d have nothing for patients and, don’t you care
about patients? I mean, I think that was a lot of the er blowback, you know, on
this side, is this, this was an anti-therapeutic stance that was also unrealistic
and not consistent with reality. It was aspirational, and maybe erm something
to guide us going forward, but to erm er demeanwhat exists as if people aren’t
helped, we know they are helped. Again, it’s maybe a process that’s partly art
and partly evidence informed and partly trial and error. But a lot of people
depend on and a lot of people get help. And his, the way he er presented, I
don’t remember it that clearly, but I remember generally, presented it was the,
demeaning of that process.
As with R2, then, R11 described he felt how the blog post sold psychiatric
knowledge and practice short and reacted strongly against this purported
claim. R9 responded similarly:
He spoke too impetuously or without adequate caution, in terms of thinking
about the consequences of what he was saying in terms of patient perceptions,
family perceptions. And so he, you know, made those bold, very negative
statements and then he realized, I mean, a number of people gave him feed-
back and he realized he should backtrack a little, but the damage had already
been done. And to be the director of the National Institute of Mental Health
that’s a bully pulpit. I mean, the president of the APA, the head of NIMH,
those are probably the two biggest pulpits, and even you know major journals
[ . . . ] don’t have that level of influence. They may have lesser levels so for
Tom to er be so negative about the day to day activities of, you know,
thousands of psychiatrists has had a bad impact on them, on patients, and
on families.
R9 felt that the antipathy toward Insel was widespread:
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I can tell you that since Tom has decided to leave nearly everyone that I’ve
talked to has said something that they didn’t feel they could say when he was
still there which was that he has done more damage to clinical psychiatry than
can be repaired in five or ten years.
Indeed, they were “astounded” by “how many people I’ve ran into since he
decided to leave who have said, ‘Gosh. What a relief.’”
In sum, RDoC was presented in my interviews as discordant with estab-
lished norms for leveraging disciplinary innovation: that is, its introduction
was seen as an “executive decision” made by Insel. This discordance was
not generally received well by the US clinicians and researchers I spoke
with; rather, it channeled a range of negative affects that bled into and hence
connected appraisals of RDoC, NIMH, and Insel. Thus, critiques of RDoC
were very commonly advanced as sometimes strong criticisms of Thomas
Insel. Whether or not RDoC could be understood to be stimulating innova-
tive psychiatric research underpinned by new ontogenies of psychopathol-
ogy was, it seems, as or even less salient than the fact that the initiative was
perceived as packaged and prescribed in the absence of wider consultation
with the (US) mental health community. A significant feature of the novelty
of RDoC constructed in the interviews, then, was its mode of instantiation.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this article, I have analyzed how key figures in US (and UK) psychiatry
construct the purpose, nature, and implications of the NIMH RDoC project.
The perspectives of my respondents were not homogenous; in particular,
differences in the appraisals of RDoC between US and UK interviewees
indicate how novelty is socially located and produced, rather than directly
reflecting some intrinsic property of an ostensibly new entity. In many areas
of the humanities and social sciences, it remains common to take scientific
designations of originality at face value and then to advance analyses of the
social, legal, and ethical ramifications of an ostensibly novel entity or
practice. In contrast, my analysis underscores the need to consider novelty
as an empirical object in its own right (see also Webster 2002, 2005). The
originality of RDoC (or any other purported innovation) is hardly clear-cut,
or something that preexists its appraisal; instead, accounts of what is new,
important, or (un)desirable are constituted through and with institutional
context and individual subjectivities.
Just because novelty requires unpacking does not mean its ascription
lacks salience. When the NIH and its subinstitutes (like the NIMH) elect
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to move their operations forward in particular ways, and perhaps especially
when those are characterized as “new,” those they fund need to orientate
their work in alignment. As Mittra (2016, 67) notes, “strategic decisions
made by organizations like the NIH [ . . . ] enact particular values and valua-
tion practices that have a material impact on the innovation ecosystem and
the practices therein.” Grantees of the NIH, as well as clinical opinion
leaders whose professional communities are presented as beneficiaries of
the research of sponsored scientists, are all too aware of the effects institu-
tional decision-making can exert on epistemic economies. The sometimes
strong statements regarding RDoC, the NIMH, and Thomas Insel that I
encountered on and off record in my interviews with leading psychiatrists
and psychologists are legible in this light.
The most affectively salient aspect of the novelty of RDoC constructed
within the interviews was not so much its conceptual architecture (though
this was configured as new), but the relationships between Insel, the NIMH,
and the wider (US) psychiatric community that RDoC instantiated. Thomas
Insel was widely perceived as acting unilaterally to impose a form of
epistemic infrastructure on mental health research, regardless of its align-
ment with the existing imaginaries and practices of clinicians and scientists.
A partial shift in psychiatric emphasis was produced through a much more
jolting break from usual modes of enjoinment.
In the US and elsewhere, tensions between the laboratory and the clinic
are long-standing and multifaceted (Kraft 2013). Articulations of friction
also contribute to constructing distance between these domains, participat-
ing in their reification as distinct spaces. RDoC was largely described as
conceptually and operationally distant from the clinic, with its novelty and
possible utility constructed as primarily relevant to the epistemology of
psychiatry—not the therapeutic practice of clinicians. My interlocutors
generally advanced low expectations (Gardner et al. 2015) about the poten-
tial of the initiative, resonating with other STS accounts of biomedicine that
have documented scientific skepticism about the import of biomedical
research for patient care (e.g., Wainwright et al. 2006). In advancing low
expectations about the therapeutic implications of RDoC, my participants
thus challenged its import and implications as rehearsed by senior NIMH
officials and performed the distinctiveness and primacy of the clinic within
psychiatric praxis. This can itself serve strategic ends within a (US) context
in which discovery (neuro)science is prioritized by mental health funders.
When introducing this article, I promised to refrain from advancing my
own straightforward criticism of RDoC; I instead sought to underscore how
encounters with it dynamically interrelate with wider epistemological,
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ontological, and affective positions and politics in psychiatry. Such norma-
tive abstinence on my part foregrounds the critical perspectives of clinicians
and scientists themselves, much of which aligns with social scientific con-
cerns about an NIMH emphasis on neurobiological research (e.g., Whooley
2014). That these criticisms were made by leaders in a profession long taken
to task by social scientists and others for its somatic emphasis suggests that
it might be time to revisit taken-for-granted assumptions about how psy-
chiatrists (want to) undertake their clinical and scientific work.5
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Notes
1. Decisions about whom to contact as institutional and/or research leaders were
shaped by my ongoing research in the sociology of mental health, conducted over
successive projects since 2005.
2. Emphasis in original (and likewise throughout the paper, unless otherwise
stated).
3. That said, during my ongoing fieldwork, I have increasingly found that UK
scientists are mentioning Research Domain Criteria in their funding bids.
4. This colloquial phrase has its origins in the lexicon of nineteenth-century coal
miners where a “squib” was an explosive device.
5. We might also want to raise questions about the distinctiveness of sociological
ontologies vis-a`-vis those of psychiatry. As Millard (2017) has shown, the imbri-
cation of psychiatric and sociological thought has long been considerable. Within
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my own fieldwork, it has been common to see psychiatrists underline social
aetiologies of subjective distress; I also frequently encounter social scientific
colleagues employing psychiatric and psychological idioms to make sense of
their own research findings. What, if anything, this observation implies is beyond
the scope of a footnote; but certainly, the history and future of the psychiatry–
sociology relationship requires further consideration.
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